Posted 12/17/2003
By Professor Louis Beres, Purdue University
"Do you know what it means to find yourselves
face to face with a madman?" asks Luigi Pirandello`s
Henry IV. "Madmen, lucky folk, construct without logic,
or rather with a logic that flies like a feather."
What is true for individuals is true for states. In the
always unpredictable state of nations, constructions
which rest upon the foundations of ordinary logic may
crumble before madness. Understood in terms of Israel`s increasingly
precarious dependence upon nuclear deterrence, however implicit, this suggests
that security built primarily upon threats of overwhelming retaliatory
destruction could fail altogether.
For the moment, no single Arab/Islamic adversary
of Israel would appear to be irrational. That is, no
adversary would appear to be ready to launch a major first-strike against
Israel using weapons of mass destruction (in the future, possibly even
nuclear
weapons) with the recognition that it would thereby elicit
a devastating reprisal. Of course, miscalculations and
errors in information could still lead a perfectly rational enemy state
to strike first, but this decision would not be the product of irrationality.
What is true today, however, may not be true for
the indefinite future. Certain enemy states — Iran now
comes immediately to mind — could ultimately decide
that "excising the Jewish cancer" from the Middle East
would be worth the costs, however massive they might
be. In principle, this prospect might be avoided by Israel
with timely "hard target" preemptions, but such
expressions of what is known under international law as "anticipatory
self-defense" are now exceedingly problematic. The difficulty lies in both
tactical and political issues.
Strictly speaking, an Iranian or other enemy "bolt-from-the-blue" CBN
(chemical, biological or even
nuclear) attack upon Israel with the expectation of city-busting reprisals
would not necessarily exhibit true irrationality or madness. Rather, within
this state`s particular ordering of preferences, the presumed religious
obligation to annihilate the "Zionist Entity" could be of absolutely overriding
value. Here, the expected benefits of such annihilation could exceed the
expected costs of ANY Israeli reprisal.
To a certain extent, an enemy state with such
orientations would represent the individual suicide
bomber writ large. Just as tens of thousands of Arab
males are now willing to die to achieve "martyrdom," so
might certain individual states soon become willing to sacrifice themselves
to fulfil the presumed will of Allah. In the second case, however, it is
conceivable that Iranian or other Arab/Islamic leaders making the decision
to strike at Israel would be more willing to make "martyrs" of their own
peoples than of themselves. Here, it would be perfectly acceptable to sacrifice
huge portions of their respective populations, but only while the leaders
themselves were already underway to a predetermined safe haven.
What is Israel to do? It can`t very well choose to
live, indefinitely, with enemies which might not be
deterred by usual threats of retaliation and who are
themselves armed with weapons of mass destruction. It
can`t very well choose to preempt against pertinent
Iranian or other military targets, because the tactical prospects of
success would be very remote and because the global outcry — even after
America`s Operation Iraqi Freedom (or especially after this newest war
against
Iraq) could be deafening. It assuredly cannot rely too
heavily upon the United States, which is continuing to
exhaust human and material resources in Iraq and which
has serious strategic worries about North Korea. And it
cannot place too much faith in anti-tactical ballistic
missile defenses, which could require a near-100 percent reliability
of intercept to be purposeful in "soft-point" protection of Israeli cities.
The strategic opportunities available to Israel may
be very limited; the existential consequences of failure
could include national extinction. What shall the
Government of Israel do? If Israel`s enemies were all presumably rational
in the ordinary sense of valuing physical survival more highly than any
other preference of combination of preferences, Jerusalem could begin to
exploit the strategic benefits of pretended irrationality. Here, recognizing
that in certain situations it can be especially rational to feign irrationality,
it could work to create more cautionary behavior among its relevant adversaries.
In such a case, the threat of an Israeli resort to a "Samson Option" could
be enough to frighten away an enemy first-strike.
If, however, Israel`s pertinent adversaries were
presumably irrational in the ordinary sense, there would
likely be no real benefit to contrived irrationality. This is the case,
because the more probable Israeli threat of a massive nuclear counterstrike
associated with irrationality would be no more compelling to Iran or any
other Arab/Islamic enemy state than if they were confronted by a fully
rational State of Israel.
It follows from all this that Israel could benefit
from greater understanding of the "rationality of
pretended irrationality," but only in particular reference
to rational enemy states. In these circumstances where
such enemy states are presumed to be irrational in the
ordinary sense, something else will be needed —
something other than nuclear deterrence, preemption or ballistic missile
defense. Although many believe the answer to this quandary lies in far-reaching
political settlements, it is an answer born of frustration and self-delusion,
not of deliberate and informed calculation. No meaningful political settlements
can be worked out with enemies who seek only Israel`s "liquidation" — a
word still used commonly in Arab/Islamic newspapers and texts.
So what is Israel to do? "In the end," we learn
from the poet Goethe, "we depend upon creatures of
our own making." What shall Israel "make?"
To begin, Israel must understand that irrationality
need not mean craziness or madness. Even an irrational
state may have a consistent and transitive hierarchy of
wants. The first task for Israel, therefore, is to ascertain this hierarchy
among its several state enemies, especially Iran. Although these states
might not be deterred from aggression by the persuasive threat of massive
Israeli retaliations, they could well be deterred by threats to what they
do hold to be most important.
What might be most important to Israel`s
prospectively irrational enemies, potentially even more important than
physical survival as a state? One answer is the avoidance of shame and
humiliation. Another is avoidance of the charge that they had defiled their
most sacred religious obligations. Still another is leaders` avoidance
of their own violent deaths at the hand of Israel, deaths that would be
attributable to strategies of "targeted killing" and/or "regime-targeting"
by Jerusalem.
These answers are only a beginning; indeed, they
are little more than the beginning of a beginning. What is needed now
is a sustained and conspicuously competent effort to answer in greater
depth and breadth.
This effort cannot be confined to Israel or
America`s established university centers of strategic
studies. Rather, it must take place wherever informed
and intellectually capable friends of Israel can be found. Indeed,
as we are dealing with nothing less than the sacred responsibility of preventing
another Holocaust, I submit that the effort to identify workable strategic
survival policies for Israel should be undertaken even in the traditional
centers of Jewish learning, in all places where Jews gather to study the
sacred texts, everywhere that Jews come together in day schools, in Yeshivot
and in universities.
Our peril, as always, is great, but our Jewish
intellectual resources are also considerable. Our study of Torah must
quickly be joined by imaginative teachers and rabbis with the study of
looming existential threats to Zion.
The wisdom of Torah must never be detached
from our most urgent considerations of survival as a
people. Each Jew is responsible for his Jewish brothers
and sisters, and every capable Jewish mind must willingly
give tangible and timely effect to what beats in each
Jewish heart. Moreover, war and genocide are assuredly
not mutually exclusive, and preventing a second
Holocaust is far too important an obligation to be left to
the professional strategists.
© The Jewish Press, 2003. All Rights Reserved.
LOUIS RENE BERES is Professor of Political Science and International
Law at Purdue University. Educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971) he is the
author of many books and articles dealing with Israeli security matters,
including Security or
Armageddon: Israel`s Nuclear Strategy. Most recently he
served as Chair of "Project Daniel," a small-group effort of senior
Israeli generals and academics to counsel the Prime Minister on existential
threats to Israel.
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