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Информация о материале
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Автор: Daniel Pipes
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Категория: english
There's some puzzlement about Mahmoud Abbas, the new chairman of the
Palestinian Authority. Does he accept Israel's existence or want to destroy
it?
Matthew Kalman of Canada's Globe and Mail discerns "an apparent campaign
flip-flop" in this regard. A Jewish Exponent story is titled "He Wants
It Both Ways: Palestinian front-runner: Anti-terror, but pro-‘return'."
An Australia Broadcast Corporation title acknowledges its mystification,
writing that "Abbas's election tactics confuse analysts."
The press dwells on the same apparent contradiction: One moment Mr.
Abbas demands that Palestinian Arab terrorists stop their attacks on Israel
and the next he (literally) embraces them, calling them "heroes fighting
for freedom." Also, he talks of both stopping the violence and of the "right
of return" for more than 4 million Palestinian Arabs to Israel, a well-known
way of calling indirectly for the elimination of the Jewish state.
What gives?
Actually, there is no contradiction. By insisting on a "right of return,"
Mr. Abbas signals that he, like Yasser Arafat and most Palestinians, intends
to undo the events of 1948; that he rejects the very legitimacy of a Jewish
state, and will strive for its disappearance. But he differs from Arafat
in being able to imagine more than one way of achieving this goal.
No matter what the circumstances, Arafat persisted, from 1965 to 2004,
in his reliance on terrorism. He never took seriously his many agreements
with Israel, seeing these rather as a means to enhance his ability to murder
Israelis. Arafat's diplomacy culminated in September 2000 with the unleashing
of his terror war against Israel; then, no matter how evident its failure,
it went on until his death in November 2004.
In contrast, Mr. Abbas publicly recognized in September 2002 that terror
had come to harm Palestinian Arabs more than Israel. Intended to prompt
demoralization and flight from Israel, this tactic in fact brought together
a hitherto fractured body politic, while nearly destroying the Palestinian
Authority and prostrating its population. Mr. Abbas correctly concluded
that "it was a mistake to use arms during the intifada and to carry out
attacks inside Israel."
Mr. Abbas shows tactical flexibility. Unlike Arafat, who could never
let go of the terrorist tool that had brought him wealth, power, and glory,
Mr. Abbas sees the situation more cogently. If stopping the violence against
Israel best serves his goal of eliminating the sovereign Jewish state,
that is his program.
He no more accepts what he so charmingly the other day called the "Zionist
enemy" than Arafat did (or Hamas, or Palestinian Islamic Jihad), but he
is open to a multiplicity of means to destroy it. As he announced after
his electoral victory this week, "the lesser jihad is over and the greater
jihad is ahead." The form of jihad must change from violent to nonviolent,
but the jihad continues.
And count the many ways to undo the Jewish state: nuclear weaponry,
invading armies, mega-terrorism, plain old terrorism, Palestinian demographic
fertility, the "right of return," or confusing Israelis to the point that
post-Zionist leftists cause the population unilaterally to crumple and
accept a dhimmi (subservient) status within "Palestine."
For an instructive parallel to Mr. Abbas' having concluded that violence
is inappropriate, consider Stalin in the decade before World War II. Aware
of his weakness, he announced in 1930 an intention for the Soviet Union
to be a good international citizen:
“Our policy is a policy of peace and of increasing trade connections
with all countries. A result of this policy is an improvement in our relations
with a number of countries, and the conclusion of a number of agreements
for trade, technical assistance, and so forth. We shall continue to pursue
this policy of peace with all our might and with all the means at our disposal.
We do not want a single foot of foreign territory”.
These were not empty words. Stalin did largely keep to this program
- until 1939, when he felt strongly enough to go on the offensive, at which
point he initiated an unparalleled half-century's campaign of aggression,
which ended only with the Soviet state's collapse.
For Mr. Abbas, it is 1930. He understands the need to cool things down.
As someone who can realistically appraise circumstances and quietly respond
to them, he is potentially a far more formidable enemy to Israel than the
one-note, blindly violent, and flamboyantly evil Arafat.
New York Sun, January 11, 2005
Russion version