Claiming a corpse in Malaysia: M Moorthy, 36, was a national hero in
Malaysia due to his mountaineering exploits, especially his being a member of
his country's first expedition to the top of Mount Everest in May 1997. He was
also a Hindu, the child of Hindu parents, married to a Hindu wife, who as
recently as two months ago was interviewed on television about his preparations
for the Hindu festival of Diwali. But he was paralyzed from the waist down due
to a 1998 injury and a fall from his wheelchair on Nov. 11 led to his death on
Nov. 20. His family, naturally, wanted to give him a Hindu funeral.
At that point, however, an Islamic
court sided with Moorthy's former colleagues in the Malaysian Armed Forces who
claimed that he had converted to Islam; the court would not even permit the
family, non-Muslims, to appear before it to dispute the matter. A dreadful
scene then occurred at the mortuary as family members jostled with state
Islamic officials and former soldiers for the body. The family lost and applied
to the country's Appellate and Special
Powers High Court,
which ruled that it could not override the Islamic courts in such a matter.
Moorthy in the end was buried as a Muslim.
The president of the Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism and Sikhism, Rev. Sri K. Dhammananda said the council was "very disturbed" by what happened and called this development "a crisis for non-Muslims because they can seek no legal remedy." He called for the repeal of a subsection of the Federal Constitution "to make it clear that the Syariah [Shari‘a] Court has no jurisdiction to hear matters involving non-Muslims." (December 29, 2005)
Levying the jizya tax in the
Palestinian Authority: Jizya is a tax specified in the Koran (9:29) to be paid by
non-Muslim males living in dar al-Islam, that is, under Muslim political
rule. In theory, it is what non-Muslims pay extra for the privilege of being
protected by the Muslim state, in whose military they may not serve. In fact,
beyond the often penurious sums involved, it has a humiliating quality to it,
reminding the kafirs that they are second-class subjects for refusing
the Islamic truth. The tax was regularly collected through Islamic history,
fading out only in the nineteenth century.
But Islamists, in keeping with other retrograde ideas, like reviving slavery, would like to re-impose the jizya. Hamas has long wanted non-Muslims in "Palestine" to pay it and as it approaches the corridors of power, this abstract wish takes on new vitality and importance. "We in Hamas intend to implement this tax someday," says a Bethlehem city council member, Hassan El-Masalmeh. "We say it openly—we welcome everyone to Palestine but only if they agree to live under our rules." (December 23, 2005)
A Consulate in Jerusalem
The U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem has a storied history, going back to 1844, when it was established
to function as a sort of "tourist agency" that helped plan trips for
traveling Americans.
In recent years, however, things have become less quaint. In particular, since World War I, there have been two consulates, one in the eastern and predominantly Arab part of the city and one in the western, or Jewish area. Although both are now in lands under Israeli control, an Arab/Israeli divide remains in place, with perhaps political overtones. A reader reports on the situation these days:
The two U.S. consulates in Jerusalem could not be more different. The one in a Jewish neighborhood has ample parking facilities but does not provide consular services and so does not deal with the public. The one in an Arab neighborhood provides those services but has no parking available nearby. Ironically, of the tens of thousands of U.S. citizens who live in Jerusalem and surrounding communities, nearly all are Jews. This means that any citizens needing to renew a passport, report a birth, deal with Social Security, etc. must go there, at least part of the way on foot. Also, despite the fact that most American citizens in the Jerusalem area are Orthodox Jews with large families, no strollers are allowed. Babies and toddlers must be carried.
As far as one can see, nearly the
entire staff at the consulate dealing with the public are Arabs, including the
security guards, clerks, ushers, cashiers, et al. The only reading material
available in the waiting area is the State Dept's, Hi International magazine - in Arabic, of course. The whole set-up feels
like a slap in the face to the American citizens it is meant to serve.
And this: U.S. missions are mandated
to display a listing of the "Most Wanted Terrorists," which consists
of about 25 FBI flyers and photos of Islamists, all Arab. How embarrassing – so
where in the eastern Jerusalem consulate does this display turn up? In a dark
and narrow hallway, at the bottom of a stairwell, that leads only to the exit,
making it noticeable only to an observant passer-by.
Given the known historic predilection of the eastern Jerusalem consulate for the Palestinians, none of this comes as a shock. But when will adult superivision come to that sensitive mission? (December 29, 2005)
Will Palestinian Prosperity End the Arab-Israeli Conflict?
There's a persistent Western hope that
if only Palestinians possessed nice apartments and late-model cars, they would
accept the status quo and call off their war against Israel. It's a projection
of Western priorities (economics trumps politics) that willfully ignores the
Palestinians' clear record of just the reverse (politics trumping economics).
It also defies the general historical record (enriching a party in the middle
of war historically prompts it to make war more energetically).
I have been critiquing this idea for
years. For example, I wrote in a 1997 discussion of Arab rejection of Israel's existence:
Caio Koch-Weser, a vice president of
the World Bank with responsibility for the Middle East, explained in 1994 that
for the peace process to succeed, "the Palestinians need to see improvements
in their living conditions very quickly." But were Palestinians interested
in the good life alone, they would long ago have settled into a comfortable
synergy with Israel's dynamic economy. Instead, they have repeatedly shown that
they are quite prepared to sacrifice the prospect of better living conditions
if doing so will further the cause of obliterating Israel.
In a 2001 critique of Thomas Friedman:
"Underneath the old, encrusted
olive-tree politics of this region," he writes, "is another politics
bursting to get out, to get connected and to tie into the world of
opportunities." Friedman's favoring of policies that disentangle Arabs
from Israelis cause him to lavish praise on former president Bill Clinton for
doing "the Lord's work" by pushing the parties so hard to reach an
agreement. Unfortunately for Friedman's thesis (and Clinton's Nobel Prize
aspirations), many Middle Easterners are still preoccupied by those
"encrusted olive-tree politics" he has relegated to the dustbin of
history
In an analysis of economics and
warfare, again in 2001:
What Israel is doing - withholding tax
money, denying entry to laborers, and restricting movement - fits into an
ancient, sensible, and somewhat effective method of warfare. Why, then, is it
expected to do otherwise? The reason, ironically, has little to do with the UN
or US and much to do with Israelis themselves. They developed the "new
Middle East" notion (which others now echo) that Israel's long-term
welfare and security lies, not in depriving its enemies of resources, but in
helping them develop their economies.
Years later, the notion of
economically growing the Palestinians out of their determination to destroy the
Jewish state has new life. Indeed, according to a headline in today's Wall
Street Journal, it's a brand-new and sparklingly original idea: "Latest Answer To Mideast Crisis:
Fix the Economy."
In a worshipful account of James Wolfensohn, the former head of the World Bank
"who is now a top diplomat in the region charged with fixing the
beleaguered Palestinian economy," Karby Leggett informs us that
Wolfensohn is betting that the Middle
East conflict needs not only a political settlement but also an economic one.
Prosperity, he believes, will blunt the appeal of extremism and give
Palestinians a stake in building a new state after years of nearly continuous
violence.
Comment: It is mildly amazing how a failed idea like this one, that Palestinian Prosperity will resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, does not die but keeps being rediscovered. (December 28, 2005)
Additional Thoughts on "Winning the Propaganda War"
Space did not permit me to make
several points in today's article, "Winning the Propaganda War," so I offer them here:
- Muslims preferring news from their coreligionists fits a larger
pattern of distancing from non-Muslims that reverts to the Koran itself.
- If Muslims won't pay attention to Western information, why would
they pay attention to Western values? The former is intended for everyone
but the latter focuses on moderates, liberals, open-minded, and curious
Muslims. Western media cannot compete in a popularity contest but they
have a message for those Muslims who are aware and thinking.
- There is one Muslim population interested in American and other
Western information, being the Iranians. Having endured a totalitarian
regime for over a quarter-century, Iranians hunger for reliable news,
political moderation, and Western popular culture rather along the lines
of their Soviet-bloc predecessors.
(December 27, 2005)
Is Islam the Problem? Is It the Solution?
Since about June 2002, I have offered an aphorism to sum up the war
on terror: "Radical Islam is the problem; moderate Islam is the
solution" (or, in earlier iterations, "Militant Islam is the problem
…). Until now, no one has particularly taken issue with this formulation. Now,
someone has. Daniel Brumberg, an associate professor of government at
Georgetown University, in an article in the Winter 2005-06 issue of the Washington
Quarterly, "Islam Is Not the Solution (or the
Problem)."
Brumberg presents three challenges to this view:
For one, it greatly underestimates the
political, social, and ideological obstacles to disseminating a liberal Islamic
ethos. These barriers are so formidable that, for the foreseeable future, any
effective engagement with Islamists will require dealing with activists, many
of whom espouse ideas profoundly at odds with U.S. notions of democracy and
freedom.
Second, naming Islam as the solution
exaggerates the extent to which Islam shapes Muslims' political identity. Not
only do ethnicity and tribal affiliation often trump religion, but many
Muslims, both practicing and nonpracticing, believe that their version of Islam
should be separated or at least distanced from politics. Indeed, little
consensus exists in the Arab world about the proper relationship between mosque
and state. On the contrary, that world is rent by profound divisions over the
very question of national identity—what it means to be Egyptian, Moroccan,
Algerian, Bahraini, or Iraqi.
Finally, the idea of Islamic democracy
fails to recognize that there is no Islamic solution to such identity
conflicts. As the drama in Iraq demonstrates, absent consensus over national
identity, this solution requires power-sharing arrangements that offer as many
groups and voices as possible a seat at the table of multiparty government.
This kind of consensus-building approach cannot succeed unless all groups check
their religions at the door. Indeed, they must agree to constitutional and
legal protections that guarantee Muslims—Shi‘a and Sunni—as well as non-Muslims
the right to believe or not to believe as they please.
In brief, moderate Muslims are too weak; national identity counts too; and Islam can get in the way. My brief replies:
- Yes, moderate Muslims are weak; I have even called them "largely fractured, isolated,
intimidated, and ineffectual." But how strong were anti-Nazi Germans
in 1943? Just as it took an outside force to destroy the German military
might then, it will take one to destroy the radical Islamic one today. It
would be foolish to expect moderate Muslims to provide this firepower.
Once the war has been won, however, who will extract Muslims from their
current predicament but the moderates? Which other candidates can fulfill
this role? And, of course, I strenuously disagree with
the idea of engaging Islamists.
- Ethnicity and tribal affiliation count plenty, as do other
affiliations and identities. But the crisis in the Muslim world is not
about nationality, tribes, ethnicity, skin color, or economic systems. It
is clearly and specifically about Muslims' understanding of Islam.
- "Islamic democracy" is a red herring, as are
power-sharing issues in Iraq. The challenge lies in Islam being
modernized, dealing with issues like jihad, the status of women,
and the role of Shari‘a.
(December 27, 2005)
Is There a Secret Arab-Israeli Trade?
That's the title of a 1998 Middle East Quarterly article by Ephraim Kleiman, Don Patinkin Professor of
Economics at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and his answer is resoundingly
negative: "Trade data fails to support the existence of a substantial
clandestine trade by Israel with the Arab countries. The rumors may have
originated from a misreading of Israeli trade statistics."
I mention his article because it's a
stock in trade of journalists covering the Middle East to engage in speculation
on this topic. Today's example is "Israel, Arab World Engage
in Hidden Trade,"
by Jasper Mortimer based in Cairo for the Associated Press. He cites a figure
of US$400 million a year provided by Gil Feiler, director of a Tel Aviv
consultancy specializing in Arab markets and economics professor at Bar Ilan
University. To Mortimer's credit, he also cites a skeptical voice, Dan
Catarivas, foreign trade director at the Israeli Manufacturers' Association,
who calls such estimates significantly inflated. "All the figures are very
sexy for the press, but the reality is much less than what is written."
Caveat lector: Israeli trade with the Arab countries is likely to remain small until the latter accept the former's existence. (December 26, 2005)
Are the Palestinians the World's Most Radicalized Population?
I believe they are. This weblog entry
provides occasioinal insights on the topic.
Endorsing Al-Qaeda terrorism: The Norwegian organization Fafo found, in a face-to face survey with 1849 respondents aged 18 years and above
in the West Bank and Gaza in the period November 21-10 December that
"Support for Al Qaeda actions in the world includes 65 percent support to
Al Qaeda actions in the USA and Europe, 32 percent support for Al Qaeda actions
in Iraq and 13 percent support for Al Qaeda actions in Jordan." Nearly
2/3s of Palestinians, in other words, support Islamist terrorism against the
West, or more – but not hugely more – than the ½ of Muslims world wide
whom I estimated in 2002 "sympathize more with Osama bin
Laden and the Taliban than with the United States." (December 22, 2005) Dec.
26, 2005 update: These views did not come out of nowhere and Palestinian Media Watch
documents the
many mechanisms by which the Palestinian Authority's "religious leadership
has been presenting its war against Israel's existence as merely one part of
its global Islamic war being fought against the Christian-Jewish West."
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