Russian version
Hezbollah's ‘victory’
- Информация о материале
- Автор: Charles Krauthammer
Jewish World Review Sept.
1, 2006 / 8 Elul, 5766
"We did not think, even 1 percent, that the capture would lead to a
war at this time and of this magnitude. You ask me, if I had known on July
11, that the operation would lead to such a war, would I do it? I say no,
absolutely not."
— Hasan Nasrallah, Hezbollah leader, Aug. 27
So much for the "strategic and historic victory" Nasrallah had claimed
less than two weeks earlier. What real victor declares that, had he known,
he would not have started the war that ended in triumph?
Nasrallah's admission, vastly underplayed in the West, makes clear
what the Lebanese already knew. Hezbollah may have won the propaganda war,
but on the ground it lost. Badly.
True, under the inept and indecisive leadership of Ehud Olmert, Israel
did miss the opportunity to militarily destroy Hezbollah and make it a
non-factor in Israel's security, Lebanon's politics and Iran's foreign
policy. Nonetheless, Hezbollah was seriously hurt. It lost hundreds of
its best fighters. A deeply entrenched infrastructure on Israel's border
is in ruins. The great hero has had to go so deep into hiding that Nasrallah
has been called "the underground mullah."
Most important, Hezbollah's political gains within Lebanon during the
war have proved illusory. As the dust settles, the Lebanese are furious
at Hezbollah for provoking a war that brought them nothing but devastation
— and then crowing about victory amid the ruins.
The Western media were once again taken in by the mystique of the "Arab
street." The mob came out to cheer Hezbollah for raining rockets on Israel
— surprise! — and the Arab governments that had initially criticized Hezbollah
went conveniently silent. Now that the mob has gone home, Hezbollah is
under renewed attack — in newspapers in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt,
as well as by many Lebanese, including influential Shiite academics and
clan leaders. The Arabs know where their interests lie. And they do not
lie with a Shiite militia that fights for Iran.
Even before the devastation, Hezbollah in the last election garnered
only about 20 percent of the vote, hardly a mandate. Hezbollah has guns,
however, and that is the source of its power. But now even that is threatened.
Hence Nasrallah's admission. He knows that Lebanon, however weak its army,
has a deep desire to disarm him and that the arrival of Europeans in force,
however weak their mandate, will make impossible the rebuilding of the
vast Maginot Line he spent six years constructing.
Which is why the expected Round Two will, in fact, not happen. Hezbollah
is in no position, either militarily or politically, for another round.
Nasrallah's admission that the war was a mistake is an implicit pledge
not to repeat it, lest he be completely finished as a Lebanese political
figure.
The Lebanese know that Israel bombed easy-to-repair airport runways
when it could have destroyed the new airport terminal and set Lebanon back
10 years. The Lebanese know that Israel attacked the Hezbollah TV towers
when it could have pulverized Beirut's power grid, a billion-dollar reconstruction.
The Lebanese know that the next time, Israel's leadership will hardly be
as hesitant and restrained. Hezbollah dares not risk that next time.
Even more important is the shift once again in the internal Lebanese
balance of power. With Nasrallah weakened, the other major factions are
closing in around him. Even his major Christian ally, Michel Aoun, has
called for Hezbollah's disarmament. The March 14 democratic movement has
regained the upper hand and, with outside help, could marginalize Hezbollah.
In a country this weak, outsiders can be decisive. A strong European
presence in the south, serious U.S. training and equipment for the Lebanese
army, and relentless pressure at the United Nations can tip the balance.
We should be especially aggressive at the United Nations in pursuing the
investigation of Syria for the murder of Rafiq Hariri and in implementing
resolutions mandating the disarmament of Hezbollah.
It was just 18 months ago that the democrats of the March 14 movement
expelled Syria from Lebanon and rose to power, marking the apogee of the
U.S. democratization project in the region. Nasrallah's temporary rise
during the just-finished war marked that project's nadir. Nasrallah's crowing
added to the general despair in Washington about a rising "Shiite crescent"
stretching from Tehran to Beirut.
In fact, Hezbollah was seriously set back, as was Iran. In the Middle
East, however, promising moments pass quickly. This one needs to be seized.
We must pretend that Security Council Resolution 1701 was meant to be implemented
and exert unrelieved pressure on behalf of those Lebanese — a large majority
— who want to do the implementing.
© 2006 WPWG
Russian version
Russian version
An introduction to MAOF
Haim Goldman
Haim Goldman
Dear Friends,
Would you believe that the undersigned has anything in common with
-- Professor Victor Davis Hanson (Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University),
-- Dr Charles Krauthammer, (Washington Post, Time, The Weekly Standard),
-- Caroline Glick (Deputy Managing Editor of the Jerusalem Post),
-- Jonathan Tobin (Executive Editor of the Philadelphia Jewish Exponent).
Amazingly, the editors of the MAOF website decided that the missives of the undersigned are worthy of translation and posting along the articles written by these distinguished authors.
The first letter was published without the consent of the undersigned.
However, after thorough examination of the laudable attitude of MAOF and of the excellent contents of the website, the undersigned had most graciously granted his permission for publication of his missives in both English and Russian.
“Analytical Group MAOF” [1] is an organisation founded about ten years ago by Russian-speaking Jewish intellectuals. The attitude of MAOF is definitely pro-Zionist -- unambiguously and unapologetically.
One of MAOF’s primary purposes is providing information and analysis about Middle-Eastern and world affairs as well as about Israel’s history, values and dilemmas. In addition to extensive publication activity in various media, MAOF also organises excursions and seminars. While the vast majority of the contents of the MAOF website is in Russian, texts originally written in English are provided in the original [2] as well as in Russian.
There are arguably about 250 millions of Russian-speakers worldwide and many of them do not read English. The indisputable motivation for the author’s permission was to grant those millions of disadvantaged people the grand benefit of reading the author’s ruminations. If the author is ever maliciously accused that his tacit motivation for authorising the publication was his craving to be listed along with the above-mentioned distinguished writers, his plea will definitely be “nolo contendere”.
The editors of MAOF expressed their gratitude by granting the undersigned a privilege that no other author got – the opportunity to review and correct the Russian translation before publication. The original letters of the undersigned are at [3] and their Russian version is at [4]. At of today, only two letters are posted but several other letters are pending translation.
You are kindly ENCOURAGED TO RECOMMEND the MAOF website to your friends and colleagues worldwide, particularly those who speak Russian. Those who do not enjoy the benefit of proficiency in the exquisite Russian language can find many thought-provoking and inspiring articles about Middle-Eastern and world affairs in the English section [2].
Sincerely,
Haim Goldman
28.10.2006
REFERENCES:
[1] http://maof.rjews.net
[2] section.php3? sid=37&num=25
[3] authorg.php3? id=2107&type=a
[4] authorg.php3? id=2166&type=a