Post-9-11 recriminations should lead to focus on action against Iranian
nukes
Jewish World Review Sept.
14, 2006 / 21 Elul, 5766
This past week, many in the chattering classes in the United States
devoted their energy to the controversy about ABC's television film "The
Path to 9/11."
Partisanship seems to dominate virtually every discussion these days.
So it was no surprise that, just as Republicans have sought to minimize
the lack of attention paid to the terror threat by the Bush administration,
so, too, have Democrats resisted the notion that the failures of the Clinton
administration be highlighted, as the film did with some respects.
With so much attention devoted to wacko conspiracy theories about the
9/11 attacks available on the Internet, and with seemingly more respectable
conversations conducted by our political elites devoted to assigning blame
to their foes and absolving their friends, intelligent discussions of the
issue have been largely crowded out by the din of nonsense.
FEW UNDERSTOOD THE DANGER
That makes for good shouting matches on the all-news cable stations,
but like many Americans, my tolerance for the genre is limited. The painful
truth about 9/11 is that outside of a few experts on the issue — such as
scholar Daniel Pipes or journalist Steven Emerson — there were precious
few writing and speaking about the danger of Islamic terrorism before Sept.
11, 2001.
And these men were routinely ignored or derided by more influential
figures in the media, academia and halls of power. If the FBI and CIA operatives
failed to gain the attention of their political masters for an all-out
commitment to resist the murderers before that date (a sore point for some
viewers of the ABC film), it was because so few were prepared to speak
out about the danger at that time.
Hence, the political support necessary for the drastic increase in
intelligence and military resources devoted to the fight was simply lacking.
If extraordinary measures such as federal forces' eavesdropping on suspected
terrorists are still considered controversial today by some, even more
limited measures aimed at rooting terror front groups were unthinkable
prior to 9/11.
And that should lead us all directly to the present day issue of Iran.
Just like Al Qaeda, which, as many have observed, "hid in plain sight"
from the view of the West, Iran's drive to produce nuclear weapons has
been anything but a secret.
When not denying the Holocaust or threatening to destroy Israel, it's
loopy leader, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has openly bragged about the
possibility. The Tehran regime even held a bizarre public ceremony back
in April replete with costumed dancers to commemorate its latest step toward
processing uranium in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions.
And Iran is not only working on a nuclear capability, they are also
striving for the acquisition of missiles that will deliver such weapons
not only to Israeli targets (the Iranians presumed first target) but to
Western capitals, too. As former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
said in speeches at several stops in Philadelphia last week, there is no
comparison between the Iranian situation and that which confronted the
West prior to the invasion of Iraq. Unlike then, "we're not guessing" about
what they've got, "we know."
The prospect of a regime run by Islamist fundamentalist Shiites gaining
such a weapon and their ability to use it is one that ought to scare every
sensible person in the West.
Some experts tell us that we must learn to live with a nuclear Iran.
They have a point because unless the United States and its allies start
acting as if this really matters, it's only a matter of time before Tehran
succeeds in its quest.
But the problem with the notion that this prospect can be lived with
lies in the difference between past nuclear threats and this one. A nuclear
Soviet Union was certainly a dangerous foe. But as Netanyahu pointed out,
the Soviets would never do anything that endangered their own survival.
Thus, whenever disputes between the Soviet Union and the West went to the
brink, Moscow was generally as interested as Washington in edging away
from the precipice.
HEAVENLY REWARDS
But the notion that we can be just as confident about deterring the
mullahs of Tehran is highly dubious. Unlike the masters of the "evil empire,"
Ahmadinejad and his religious mentors buy into a ideology that prizes celestial
martyrdom, not terrestrial conquest.
In addition to hoping to generate the return of a "Twelfth Imam" —
a Shiite messiah — some in his circle have already made plain that even
if Iran were to suffer a nuclear response from Israel after a strike on
the Jewish state, they would still "win" since more of them would be left,
and those who died would be happy martyrs.
While such "Dr. Strangelove" scenarios seem to be more science fiction
than realpolitik to us, to the Islamist mindset the prospect of the hedonist
rewards of martyrdom is not the stuff of satire. It is real, and the prospect
of it coming to pass is no longer theoretical.
What can America do about it? There are no easy answers.
A U.N. resolution on the issue (if indeed such a resolution can be
passed) is a must, but anyone waiting for our allies to enact tough sanctions
on Tehran and making them stick is kidding themselves.
Relying on Israel to take out Iranian nuclear facilities as they did
with Iraq in 1981 is also a nonstarter.
So at some point, whether in the last years of the George W. Bush administration
or in the term of his successor, an American president is going to have
to face his people with the distasteful proposition of either letting the
lunatics go nuclear or to take drastic action that might include military
force.
Unless the Iranians have a very unlikely change of heart, the United
States — whether it is led by Republicans or a Democrat — will have to
swallow hard and act to prevent an event that has the capability of making
9/11 look as insignificant in scale to us as the then-shocking 1915 sinking
of the liner Lusitania by a German U-boat does now.
That president's ability to face up to that challenge will depend on
how ready the American public and its leaders have made themselves for
the prospect.
If a "failure of imagination" was one of the prime causes of the lack
of prevention of 9/11, as the federal commission appointed to probe the
issue ascertained, then let there be no doubt that a similar inability
to imagine the consequences of a nuclear Iran will be far more serious.
So rather than worrying about whether it was George W. Bush or Bill
Clinton — along with their respective wise men and flunkies — who are more
to blame for 9/11, it would behoove us all to think about the next catastrophe
waiting down the road. Now is exactly the time to start imagining it.
© 2005, Jonathan Tobin
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