National Post | April 4, 2003
In the Western world, knowledge of history is poor -- and the awareness
 of history is frequently poorer. For example, people often argue today
 as if the kind of political order that prevails in Iraq is part of
the
 immemorial Arab and Islamic tradition. This is totally untrue. The
kind
 of regime represented by Saddam Hussein has no roots in either the
Arab
 or Islamic past. Rather, it is an ideological importation from Europe
--
 the only one that worked and succeeded (at least in the sense of being
 able to survive).
In 1940, the French government accepted defeat and signed a separate
 peace with the Third Reich. The French colonies in Syria and Lebanon
 remained under Vichy control, and were therefore open to the Nazis
to do
 what they wished. They became major bases for Nazi propaganda and
 activity in the Middle East. The Nazis extended their operations from
 Syria and Lebanon, with some success, to Iraq and other places. That
was
 the time when the Baath Party was founded, as a kind of clone of the
 Nazi and Fascist parties, using very similar methods and adapting a
very
 similar ideology, and operating in the same way -- as part of an
 apparatus of surveillance that exists under a one-party state, where
a
 party is not a party in the Western democratic sense, but part of the
 apparatus of a government. That was the origin of the Baath Party.
 When the Third Reich collapsed, and after an interval was replaced
by
 the Soviet Union as the patron of all anti-Western forces, the
 adjustment from the Nazi model to the Communist model was not very
 difficult and was carried throughout without problems. That is where
the
 present Iraqi type of government comes from. As I said before, it has
no
 roots in the authentic Arabic or Islamic past. It is, instead, part
of
 the most successful and most harmful process of Westernization to have
 occurred in the Middle East.
When Westernization failed in the Middle East, this failure was followed
 by a redefinition and return to older, more deep-rooted perceptions
of
 self and other. I mean, of course, religion.
Religion had several advantages. It was more familiar. It was more
 readily intelligible. It could be understood immediately by Muslims.
 Nationalist and socialist slogans, by contrast, needed explanation.
 Religion was less impeded. What I mean is that even the most ruthless
of
 dictatorships cannot totally suppress religiously defined opposition.
In
 the mosques, people can meet and speak. In most fascist-style states,
 openly meeting and speaking are rigidly controlled and repressed. This
 is not possible in dealing with Islam. Islamic opposition movements
can
 use a language familiar to all, and, through mosques, can tap into
a
 network of communication and organization.
This gave to religious arguments a very powerful advantage. In fact,
 dictatorships were even helping them by eliminating competing
 oppositions. They had another great advantage in competing with
 democratic movements. Such movements must allow freedom of expression,
 even to those who are opposed to them. Those who are opposed to them
are
 under no such obligation. Indeed, their very doctrines require them
to
 suppress what they see as impious and immoral ideas -- an unfair
 advantage in this political competition.
These religious movements have another advantage. They can invoke the
 very traditional definition of "self" and "enemy" that exists in the
 Islamic world. It is very old. We see it, for example, in
 historiography. We can talk of European history as a struggle against,
 for example, the Moors, or the Tartars. If you look at contemporary
 historiography for the Middle East's Muslim peoples, their struggle
is
 always defined in religious terms. For their historians, their side
is
 Islam, their ruler is the lord of Islam, and the enemy is defined as
 infidels. That earlier classification has come back again. Osama bin
 Laden's habit of defining his enemies as "crusaders" illustrates this.
 By "crusaders," bin Laden does not mean Americans or Zionists.
 "Crusaders," of course, were Christian warriors in a holy war for
 Christendom, fighting to recover the holy places of Christendom, which
 had been lost to Muslim conquerors in the 7th century. Bin Laden sees
it
 as a struggle between two rival religions.
I say again: To blame the Saddam Hussein-type governments on Islamic
and
 Arabic traditions is totally false. Those traditions led to the
 development of societies that, while not democratic in the sense of
 having elected bodies, produced limited governments. That is,
 governments limited by the holy law, limited in a practical sense by
the
 existence of powerful groups in society, like the rural gentry and
the
 military and religious establishments. These acted as constraints on
the
 power of the government. The idea of absolute rule is totally alien
to
 Islamic practice until, sad to say, modernization made it possible.
 What the process of modernization did was to strengthen the sovereign
 power, and place at the disposal of the sovereign power the whole modern
 apparatus of control and repression. Modernization also weakened the
 intermediate powers, which previously limited the powers of the state
 and had acted as a countervailing force. Modernization meant a shift
 from old elites living on their estates, to new elites who regarded
the
 state as their estate.
Modernization has not erased the fact that the peoples of the Muslim
 Middle East have a tradition of limited, responsible government. While
 not democratic, this tradition shares many features of democratic
 Western governments. It provides, I believe, a good basis for the
 development of democratic institutions -- as has happened elsewhere
in
 the world. I remain cautiously optimistic for their future.
 Bernard Lewis is the Cleveland E. Dodge Professor of Near Eastern
 Studies, Emeritus, at Princeton University. He has written numerous
 books about Islam, including, most recently, The Crisis Of Islam: Holy
 War And Unholy Terror (March 2003). This essay is adapted from the
8th
 Annual Barbara Frum Lecture delivered by Prof. Lewis in Toronto which
 will be broadcast on CBC Radio's IDEAS on April 24.
 
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