Peace in the Middle East will not be won on the West Bank.
http://www.nationalreview.com/hanson/hanson061303.asp
June 13, 2003, 8:45 a.m.
Since the time of the Greeks a hallmark of Western military practice
has been the tendency to seek out an enemy, and then through superior discipline,
shock, and technology, to smash him — thus obtaining victory through the
destruction of his forces on the field of battle. From Alexander the Great
to Napoleon, the idea was that head-on victories, in daylight and without
guile, would alone lead to strategic resolution.Sometimes, of course, critics
objected that such hammer blows were too costly a method of defeating an
enemy. In rare cases, especially against less traditional foes, shock attacks
merely achieved tactical victory without ensuring the strategic defeat
of the enemy and with it the end of his will to resist.In short, unimaginative
slugging-it-out with other Western armies often could lead to something
like Antietam or Verdun, while sending massed columns against non-traditional
nomads, skirmishers, or infiltrators could end in ambush, attrition, or
exhaustion, as Crassus, General Westmoreland, or Ariel Sharon (in Lebanon)would
attest.In response to the butcher's bill of face-to-face battle, a number
of innovative generals — including Epaminondas, Frederick the Great, Sherman,
or Patton — sought speed, ruse, or maneuver to avoid or at least augment
decisive battle. They preferred instead either to outflank the enemy or
to attack him at his rear to erode support at the front. For all the brilliance
of Ulysses S. Grant, his death grip on Lee's army of Northern Virginia
did not quite win the Civil War — until a grim Sherman romped through Georgia
and the Carolinas and caused economic disruption, troop desertion, and
general despair among Confederates, who sensed that a massive army of the
West was on the loose at the rear. Freeing the helots in the Laconian heartland,
not simply defeating the Spartans at Leuctra, finished Sparta.In some sense,
what we are just now witnessing in the Middle East is the emergence of
a strategic version of what the military historian B. H. Liddell Hart once
labeled "the indirect approach." After five bloody wars (1947,1956, 1967,
1973, and 1982), no Arab army dares any more to confront the Israeli Defense
Forces head-on. In the past half-century, too many Arab conscripts have
died trying. There is no longer a Soviet Union to bail out failed offensives
as they were about to degenerate into abject routs. The technological revolution
of the last 20 years — drones, GPS-guided bombs, new breakthroughs in armor
and smart rockets — has only widened the gulf between Israel and its opponents.
I wish I could attribute the absence of any conventional Arab offensive
in the last 20 years to a change of political climate or a willingness
to abide by past accords. But unfortunately it is more likely that the
Egyptians or Syrians concluded that the next time their tanks headed to
Tel Aviv, there was nothing stopping the counterassaults from ending up
in downtown Cairo or Damascus.Nevertheless, tactical victory and military
dominance have not yet led to strategic victory. Israel, it is true, is
relatively safe from conventional enemies, but not from suicide bombers,
assorted terrorists, and the exhausting Intifada. Its enemies wisely turned
to an asymmetrical, postmodern struggle in which the Arab world and Europe
— thanks to the global media, political calculation, Western postcolonial
guilt, fear of terror, oil worries, and old-fashioned anti-Semitism — would
reinvent killers into freedom fighters. Meanwhile, the Palestinian street
adopted a sort of nihilism that their own ongoing wretchedness was worth
it if at least a modicum of the same misery might be imparted to the Jews.
In this new rope-a-dope strategy, what good are some of the worlds' best
pilots and tankers when their enemies do not attack in armored columns
or aircraft sorties, but as killers shooting from the sanctuary of houses
and women with bombs strapped inside their shawls? In short, while the
war will not be lost along the West Bank, it still will not quite be won
there either, since neither armed action nor peace processes will restrain
all the Palestinian terrorists and killers. Under any agreement, a no-nonsense
Sharon can do his part by controlling Israeli extremists in a manner impossible
for any present Palestinian leader. For all the crocodile tears about mayhem
emanating from Palestinian "moderates," there is private satisfaction that
there are at least a few hundred fanatics around whose brains and bomb
belts make them projectiles as accurate as the latest GPS bomb. Again,
Israel cannot achieve strategic victory — given world opinion and its own
moral code, which prevents permanent annexation on the lines of a Tibet,
Cyprus, eastern Germany, or Soviet-controlled Japanese Islands — by daily
defeating just the forces Hamas, Hezbollah, or Mr. Arafat's stealthy cadres
send at them.Yet Israel can still achieve stalemate with the militants,
as was proved in the latest round of sniping in the alleys of the West
Bank, even as it seeks alternate methods of weakening its enemy. While
pessimists lament the intractable forces that prevent resolution, the position
of the Islamic and Palestinian radicals has in fact already markedly weakened
— and from the rear.The withdrawal of American troops from Saudi Arabia,
coupled with its devastating victories over the Taliban and Saddam Hussein,
give the United States new flexibility in chasing down the abettors of
terror. The suicide attacks on Russians in Chechnya and Arabs in Saudi
Arabia has eroded support of such tactics in these countries, which formerly
sponsored the Palestinian cause. And if terrorists in the past calculated
that the United States either could not or would not strike at their sanctuaries,
they now accept that neither premise is tenable.If we continue to get tough
with Syria and Iran, and if we stay the course in Iraq, we can turn generic
terrorism in the Middle East into a sort of Potemkin existence — snarly,
ugly, loud marchers, who when the cameras cut out skulk home in fear that
either American arms or a suddenly hostile host government are waiting
at the door. Even as bombers strap on their munitions and head for Israel,
an entire avalanche of events, both military and cultural, is undermining
their entire bankrupt ideology — whether it be pan-Arabism, theocracy,
or international jihad.The strategic balance is tipping ever so gradually
away from the terrorists and toward the realists, who grasp that the end
is coming for Hamas or Hezbollah, and for the safe houses of Lebanon, Syria,
and the West Bank from which they unleash their terror. Yasser Arafat is
no longer welcome at the White House; he sees that some of his old cronies,
such as Abu Nidal, Abu Abbas, and Saddam Hussein, are no longer on the
loose.Extremists are beginning to look around. What they see cannot give
them comfort: No more Islamist government in Afghanistan; no more terrorist
subsidy from Saddam Hussein; no more Saudi telethons raising cash to pay
for nails, ball bearings, and suicide belts. Syria and Iran are both worried
that a not-quite-predictable United States might find proof of al Qaeda,
WMD, or Baathists in their suburbs. Democracy of sorts is working in Turkey,
and symptoms of such a strange Western disease now appear in the Gulf.
Add to that a seductive American popular culture that has gone global,
and the ensuing political and social calculus does not favor lunatics in
smocks and bombs mouthing Koranic incantations. Even the most cynical American
critic knows that we — so unlike past occupying Soviets in Kabul or Iraqis
in Kuwait — are offering hope for Afghanistan and Iraq, extending the honorable
and humane choice to cease the terror and enjoy liberal government in its
place.If Israel can hold on, forces larger than Mr. Arafat are already
at work. These forces will soon convince the most diehard rejectionists
that if they don't make peace now, there is a General Sherman of sorts
loose in the hinterland, with Reconstruction in his wake. The next time
a Hamas mouthpiece brags about all the mayhem and death to come, he should
remember the fate of Baghdad Bob, who, before he became a pop icon, shrieked
the same threats to a bought world press — even as his audience heard Abrams
tanks pulling up to his rear.The key to all of this is the resolve of the
United States. Now more than ever we must press on and give to the terrorists
and their abettors no quarter — and to the reformers help, protection,
and hope. President Bush has announced that players in the Middle East
must now decide whether they are with or against the terrorists. Let them
choose and let us act accordingly, as unyielding to our enemies as we are
magnanimous to our friends.
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