But those of us who saw the problem as larger than Arafat – as resulting, rather, from the deep radicalization of the Palestinian body politic – expected little change. Indeed, I wrote at the time of Mahmoud Abbas' election to head the Palestinian Authority that, "he is potentially a far more formidable enemy to Israel" than was Arafat.
How do things look half a year after Arafat's death? About as awful as anyone might have expected. Specifically, Mr. Abbas is unambiguously leading the Palestinians to war after the Israeli retreat from Gaza in August 2005. Consider some recent developments.
·
Hiring terrorists
as soldiers: Rather than
arrest terrorists, as required by the informal February 2005 cease-fire between
Israel and the Palestinians, Mr. Abbas has instituted a unique employment
program for them, incorporating them into his security forces. The Associated
Press explains the charming point system
to determine who gets what rank: "A high school diploma … is worth eight
points, while a year in an Israeli prison or on the run counts for two points
each. Gunmen don't get credit for time served in Palestinian lockups, but they
win extra points if they were wounded by Israeli army fire or had their homes
demolished." The Israeli authorities have
accepted that
even convicted Palestinian killers carry weapons.
·
Arming
terrorists: The Palestinian
military intelligence agency facilitates terrorist groups smuggling SA-7 Strela
shoulder-fired missiles into Gaza to use against Israeli aircraft.
·
Inciting the
population: As Palestinian Media Watch, the Center for Special Studies, and Michael Widlanski have exhaustively detailed, the political
speeches, press content, mosque sermons, school textbooks, and wall posters
remain as rabidly anti-Israel and anti-Semitic as during the worst days of
Arafat's rule. For example, Ahmad Qureia, the PA's so-called prime minister,
has threatened "an
explosion"
over Israel's handling of Al-Aqsa Mosque.
·
Pretend
arrests of terrorists: As
under Arafat, the PA plays the charade of arresting terrorists with fanfare and
then allowing them quietly to "escape" from prison. Two examples of
these revolving-door arrests: Two perpetrators who
assisted a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv in February 2005 left jail in
April; and the Palestinian police arrested their first
Hamas terrorist
on May 2 but promptly released him one day later.
As a result of these steps,
Palestinian terrorism, especially coming out of Gaza, has dramatically
increased since April. Things have reached such a low point that one analyst, Leslie Susser, finds that the February cease-fire "may be on
the verge of collapse."
It is hard to argue with Caroline Glick's
conclusion that
the Sharon government and the Bush administration were both "horribly
wrong" in betting on Mr. Abbas. And yet, neither of them concedes this
error because, having stressed Mr. Abbas's good intentions, both now find
themselves deeply invested in the success of his political career.
The planned Israeli withdrawal from
Gaza in August is likely to precipitate new rounds of violence. One could come
in July, as the Israel Defense Forces engages in a massive sweep of Gaza to
ensure that the forthcoming retreat takes place not under Palestinian fire.
More violence could follow in
September, as the Palestinians, Gaza now under their belt, begin a new assault
on Israel. That round presumably will feature the substantial rocket arsenal
that Hamas has been amassing. Israel's chief of staff, Moshe Ya'alon, is on record
predicting,
"Immediately after the disengagement we can expect a burst of
terrorism."
Thus has Ariel Sharon neatly arrayed
all the elements for a massive train wreck.
Ironically, the one thing that might
prevent this scenario from playing out would be a Hamas victory in the
Palestinian council elections scheduled for mid-July. Israeli voices are
increasingly calling for the Gaza withdrawal to be postponed or even annulled
should Hamas do well, as seems likely. For example, Israel's foreign minister, Silvan Shalom, has said if Hamas wins the elections, it would be
"unreasonable" to implement the disengagement plan and allow Hamas to
create a "Hamas-stan" in Gaza.
So, there are many possibilities in
the next four months. Their common element is that by September, the
Arab-Israeli theater will be in yet worse shape than it is today.
New
York Sun
May 17, 2005
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