1) Demonstrations against Oslo have had no impact on any government of Israel, and will not have any impact unless they are of REVOLUTIONARY magnitude. This does not mean demonstrations have no positive value:
raising public awareness, etc.   Nevertheless, demonstrations can actually become counterproductive if they distract thought and energy and divert resources required to remedy the fundamental causes of Israel’s malaise.Superficial critics focus on the flaws of leaders or their flawed policies, when these flaws may be, to a great extent, the consequence of REGIME flaws.
 2) Much the same may be said of critical analysis of the “peace process.” Though necessary, they too can become counterproductive.  Not only may they generate despondency, but they too can short circuit positive goals and creative thinking required to deal with regime flaws.
 3) Both demonstrations and critical analyses of the “peace process” presuppose that Israel has a democratic government.  This is a fatal mistake.  If Israel were a genuine democracy, the countless demonstrations and critical analyses of the government, from Begin to Barak, would have had a discernible impact on public policy.
 4) Both demonstrations and critical analyses employ the “direct” approach, as military scientists might say.  But in the conflict between the citizens of Israel and its government, one must often employ an indirect approach.
I have long advocated placing on the public agenda a controversial issue that derails Oslo – such as demanding the indictment of seditious Arab MKs.
 5) Short of a revolution, only one kind of direct approach can possibly succeed.  This needs a preface.
 a) In the 1992 and 1999 elections, it was estimated that there was a floating vote of 20%.  It may have been greater, judging from the success of Shinui (6 seats), Israel Beiteinu (4 seats); Center (6 seats) – three new  parties (I know Shinui was not quite new), and Shas (17 seats).  Of course this was the result of the decline of both Labor and the Likud.
 b) Now, given the disillusionment with Barak, hence with the Left, it’s reasonable to assume that the floating vote will be much more than 20%. Israel B’Aliya and Mafdal have been fragmented.  Echud Leumi is going  nowhere.  Likud, with or without Bibi, will make no great gains. Therefore, the time is ripe for a new Nationalist Party, provided it has a positive and not merely an anti-Oslo goals.  The goal must be the reconstruction of the  State of Israel on solid Jewish foundations, and this entails a Jewish Constitution.
 c) This is why I have proposed a United Front of extra-parliamentary nationalist groups.  This combinat5ion of dedicated organizations has a large potential electoral base, given the large floating vote.  The trouble  is two-fold.  First, there is a prejudice against forming a new political party, even though it would be a party like no other.  Second, most extra-parliamentary groups are led by people who, though very intelligent, do not think in institutional terms.  They also feel there is no time for an institutional or constitutional approach.  What they fail to see is that not only is such an approach necessary, but that it does not preclude the formation of teams to deal with immediate problems, such as toppling Barak, forming a civilian defense force, etc.  They fail to see that the existing system of government is itself a basic cause of Israel’s Oslovian decline. And then, of course – and forgive me for saying it – but there is such a thing as organizational egotism.   This hinders the establishment of a  United Front.
 6) Nevertheless, given the decrepit character of existing political parties, I believe Israel’s only hope is the formation of a new party, a party like no other.  I have a comprehensive program for such a party.  I also hav name for such a party, one that all extra-parliamentary nationalist groups will agree to, but I am saving it for the time when we transcend demonstrations against, and critical analyses of, Oslo.