Jewish World Review August
18, 2006 / 24 Menachem-Av, 5766
http://www.JewishWorldReview.com | The charm of any U.N. Security Council
resolution lies in the preamble, which invariably begins by "recalling"
all previous resolutions on the same subject that have been entirely ignored,
therefore necessitating the current resolution. Hence newly minted Resolution
1701: Before mandating the return of south Lebanon to Lebanese government
control, it lists the seven Security Council resolutions going back 28
years that have demanded the same thing.
We are to believe, however, that this time the United Nations means
it. Yet, the fact that responsibility for implementation is given to Kofi
Annan's office — not known for integrity, competence or neutrality — betrays
a certain unseriousness about the enterprise from the very beginning.
Now, it is true that had Israel succeeded militarily in its strategic
objectives, there would have been no need for any resolution. Israel would
have unilaterally cleaned out south Lebanon and would be dictating terms.
But that did not happen. The first Israel-Hezbollah war ended in a tie,
and in this kind of warfare, tie goes to the terrorist. Yet there is no
doubt that had Israel been permitted to proceed with the expanded offensive
it began two days before the cease-fire, Israel would eventually have destroyed
Hezbollah in the south, albeit at great cost to itself, Lebanon and Israel's
patron, the United States. Which is why the war was called off.
Having obviated that possibility with the cease-fire, the United States
is left with certain responsibilities. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
gave assurances that this resolution would not be a dead letter; that it
had enough Chapter 7 (i.e., legally enforceable) language to give it teeth;
that there would indeed be a buffer zone below the Litani River; that there
would be a robust international force with robust rules of engagement.
Yet, within days, these assurances are already fraying. Hezbollah has
declared that it will not disarm. The Siniora government in Beirut has
acquiesced in a "don't ask, don't tell" deal in which Hezbollah retains
its entire infrastructure south of the Litani — bunkers, weapons, fighters
— with the cosmetic proviso that none will be displayed very openly. No
strutting, but everything remains in place awaiting the order to restart
the war when the time is right.
That arrangement is essentially a return to the status quo ante — precisely
what the United States had said it would not permit because that would
represent a strategic disaster for the forces of democracy and moderation
in the region.
We are headed for a complete repudiation of the bottom-line American
position. The stakes are high. Not so much for Israel, which in the end
will take care of itself. By the now-inevitable Round Two, Israel will
have rejected the failed Olmert-led exercise in hesitancy and will have
new leadership, new tactics and new equipment (for example, expensive new
plating for its tanks, which were so vulnerable to advanced Iranian antitank
weaponry).
What is most at stake, from the American perspective, is Lebanon. Lebanon
was the most encouraging achievement of the democratization project launched
with great risk with the invasion of Iraq. The Beirut Spring, the liberation
from Syrian rule and the election of a pro-Western government marked the
high point (together with the first Iraqi election, which inspired the
events in Lebanon) of the Bush doctrine.
Syria, Iran and Hezbollah have been working assiduously to reverse that
great advance. Hezbollah insinuated itself into the government. The investigation
of Syria for the murder of Rafiq Hariri has stalled. And now, with the
psychological success of the war with Israel, Hezbollah may soon become
the dominant force in all of Lebanon. In the south, the Lebanese army will
be taking orders from Hezbollah. Hezbollah is not just returning to being
a "state within a state." It is becoming the state, with the Siniora government
reduced to acting as its front.
That is why ensuring that Hezbollah is cut down to size by a robust
international force with very strict enforcement of its disarmament is
so critical. For all its boasts, Hezbollah has suffered grievously militarily,
with enormous losses of fighters, materiel and infrastructure. Now is its
moment of maximum weakness. That moment will not last long. Resupply and
rebuilding have already begun.
This is no time for the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations to be
saying, when asked about the creation of an international force, that "this
really is a responsibility of the Secretariat." Maybe officially, but if
we are not working frantically behind the scenes to make sure that this
preposterously inappropriate body gets real troops in quickly, armed with
the right equipment and the right mandate, the moment will be lost. And
with it Lebanon.
© 2006 WPWG
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