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The expulsion of Jews from Gaza and North Samaria must become a pivotal point in all the future actions of the Israeli National Camp. The events of the last few years, culminating in the transfer of Jews, unequivocally demonstrated that the government system currently existing in Israel is totally dysfunctional in serving the interests and aspirations of the vast majority of the Israeli Jews.

Before any attempt to change this system is to be made, it is necessary to elucidate the underlying streams of the Israeli political life. The ultimate objective of the National Camp ought to be not just winning the Prime Ministerial position, but rather creating conditions allowing the PM to influence and eventually transform the political system. Putting it differently, the PM elected on the platform of the National Parties must be able to put into practice the strategy of the political movement he represents.

Despite the fact that at the last elections all parties considered to be “national” obtained 69 mandates (Likud, Mafdal, Shas, United Torah, Israel ba Alia), while the Left and Arab parties received only 51, the policy of Ariel Sharon has been absolutely compliant with the election promises of the opposition. It is undisputable that the ideas of “creation of the Palestinian state” and “retreat from the occupied territories” were the key points on the political platform of the Left, while never appeared on the programs of the National Camp.

Moreover, taking into account that Israel was established as a Jewish state and the Arab parties, possessing 8 mandates in the Knesset, show no devotion to the Jewish people (to say the least), the real preponderance of the national forces was much more significant. It constituted 62%, or about 2/3 of all Jewish votes. In any democratic country it would be interpreted as an overwhelming victory. In any democratic country, but not in Israel. In the Israeli political system the actual aspiration of the voters have hardly anything to do with the policy conducted by the Government.

One of the major reasons for such a phenomenon is the fact that in Israel there is no separation between the executive and legislative branches of power. As professor Israel Hanukoglu wrote in his recent article, “The cabinet, as the executive power, is composed of MKs (Members of Knesset) of the party coalition, and they continue to serve in both the Knesset and the cabinet. The Knesset does not constitute an independent branch to check and balance the executive branch and its policies.”

Even more importantly, this executive-legislative symbiosis exists on the basis of the depraved electoral system, which turned Israeli voters into the “blank shots”: the shots are fired, the thunder from the shots is heard, but the actual effect is zero. Because it is not up to voters to determine who will get a place on the election list of a party, but exclusively up to the buddies, relatives, pals, colleagues, and political allies of the candidates among the party leadership. Professor Hanukoglu further continues:
 “The present system of party activists choosing MKs creates a situation where being an MK has become a long-term job. The dependence between the party cronies and MKs are mutual. Many of the party cronies' jobs or interests depend on their ties to MKs. So, irrespective of what the MK does or doesn't accomplish, even if they are abject failures, the system continues to elect them to guarantee perks for party cronies. This corrupt system creates a situation in which there is no competition, no new generation of leaders, and no democratic system of decisions.”

To support the above analysis, just consider how regularly, sometimes even more often than they change their underwear, the MKs switch the side they belong to, if this move helps them to keep their prized seats. Professor Paul Eidelberg observed, that before the 1999 elections 29 MKs (almost 25%(!) of all Knesset members) crossed the floor and moved to another, often rival, political party in order to remain in the Knesset. Given that the situation in the judiciary system is even worse (according to information in the Israeli media, 64% of the judges and legal professionals are relatives of one or another kind), it is no wonder that Israel, to its shame, is listed as the second most corrupted state among all the developed countries.
According to the research published by the World Bank on 3rd of August 2005, Israel’s index of the state corruption (estimating the degree of abusing of power by the government officials) dropped to 80.8%, which is much lower that the average index of 91.4%. Only Italy has a lower index – 74.9%, but at least the Italian politicians, if caught, have enough principles and guts to resign, while their Israeli colleagues try to remain glued to their seats forever and would rather sell their own mothers than agree to leave the Knesset.

The impatient reader might ask: what is the connection between all this and the strategy of the National Camp? To put it very straight the most direct one: any action by the National Camp is doomed to failure unless the necessity of the total changes to the Israeli political structure and the way it is functioning is taken into account. In that respect, doesn’t matter who leads the Israeli politics: Netanyahu or Landau, Feiglin or Israel Katz. While the Israeli sinecures are kept untouched, no PM will be able to attain the significant positive results. All previous “right-wing” cabinets of Begin, Shamir and Netanyahu should be considered as a complete waste of time for exactly that reason: they did nothing to change the state apparatus. Actually, the Israeli voters were deceived numerous times. For example, when they said a clear “No” to the Left and brought Likud to power under the leadership of M. Begin, the only thing that changed was the label. The ruling elite gave in the fa?ade but kept the firm grip on the steering wheel.
What’s the point of having a PM who represents the Likud Party, if the media, the judicial system and the educational institutions continue to perform the same old tune? As an example, if, during his premiership, Netanyahu have made a serious effort to legalize the status of the radio station Arutz Sheva, the national camp might have had its voice heard today. On the other hand, to blame Netanyahu personally for this failure would be unfair: from the very beginning of his term as a PM he has been under constant vicious attacks from the Israeli Left, and had no defenders in his political struggle.

Very characteristic in this regard is the so-called “Bar-On Affair” (“Bar-On - Hevron Affair”). As Benjamin Zeev Kahane explained at the time, when Netanyahu attempted to appoint Ronnie Bar-On as an Attorney General, the left Israeli establishment organized a furious campaign to revoke the move – not because they felt the smell of corruption, but out of the concern that Bibi dared to intervene in their “holy of holiest” – the jurisdiction over the Israeli legal system. In other words, he tried to take the first step in dismantling the System by injecting “his man”, not theirs, and the elite could not allow that to happen. In May 1997 Benjamin Kahane wrote that the power-holding circles in Israel, in order to uphold control over the country “fortified their position in the judiciary - the Supreme Court, the Attorney General, etc. With this power, they are able to overturn any decision which they don't like, by claiming it is ‘illegal’, or ‘undemocratic.’” Those who doubt this statement may have a look at the actions of the Israeli High Court before and during the Sharon’s “disengagement”. The Court’s vigorous “activist” intervention into Israeli political affairs exceeded all the reasonable limits.

To be continued…

September, 11, 2005
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Boris Shusteff is an engineer.  He is also a research associate with the Freeman Center for Strategic Studies.

Translated by R. Ganz.

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