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A briefing by Ilan Berman
September 14, 2005
http://www.meforum.org/article/774

Mr. Berman is vice president for policy at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC. An expert on security issues in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Russia, he has consulted for the CIA and the Pentagon and is a frequent guest on radio and television. His writings have appeared in The National Interest, the International Herald Tribune, Financial Times and Middle East Quarterly. He is adjunct professor at the National Defense University and editor of the Journal of International Security Affairs.

The Danger

The Iranian government is moving aggressively towards acquiring nuclear capability that it could easily transform into an offensive nuclear arsenal. The nuclear endeavor is clear: the authorities have hidden sites, are involved in plutonium conversion and uranium enrichment, and they have prevented the IAEA inspectors from entering certain sites. Further, sites that were inspected have been sanitized by removal of certain equipment.
Iran's nuclear endeavor started under the shah and inherited by the leaders of the Khomeini government whose mentality is cause for acute concern. The Iranians see themselves having a choice, to become like North Korea, which possesses nuclear weapons and thus stands out of the reach of the US, or to end up like Iraq, invaded and with a new government. Not surprisingly, they see nuclear weapons as a tool to deter Washington rather than cause an attack.
But Iran's nuclear capability is not Americans' only concern. The regime has long ranked high as a sponsor of terrorism. Its expanding Hezbollah's reach has led, for example, to the sending of 12,000 artillery pieces and short-range rockets that the Shiite militia in Lebanon now possesses for use against Israel. Tehran is also helping Hezbollah expand in Africa. American officials say Hezbollah's capabilities equal or exceed those of Al-Qaeda.
It once was thought that Shiites and Sunnis would not cooperate because of theological differences but it is now clear that the Iranians and Al-Qaeda have found common cause. At least 10 percent of Al-Qaeda's communications go through Iran, as at least some authorities there are aware. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian-born terrorist, won safe haven in Iran and his insurgency operations are now taking place in its Kurdish regions.
Tehran has also meddled in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israeli officials sources state that Hezbollah has directed over 50 separate Palestinian terrorist cells in 2004, a sevenfold increase from 2002. Hezbollah (and Iran) are filling a political vacuum in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The Iranian leadership perceives U.S. actions such as the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as a threat and has been interfering in Iraq to avoid the democratization in that country as a way to stave off the same prospect in Iran itself. It has been increasing its activity in the post-Soviet states to co-opt countries that could be useful to the U.S. Tehran signed a bilateral security agreement with the Syrian government that said neither country would host troops that would be hostile to the other. In addition, Iran has increased its naval presence in the Caspian Sea, which is a substantial energy hub. Co-opting the countries in the region would have negative consequences on the energy market.
 

The Rest of the World

In the Persian Gulf, the balance of power is shifting away toward Iran, now the region's dominant military power. Iran receives investments from Russia, China, and North Korea, while making pacts with the Saudis, Kuwaitis, and Iraqis. The U.S. protective umbrella in the Persian Gulf is receding; Iran and its smaller neighbors are starting to make security pacts.
The U.S. government tried negotiations with Tehran through the EU, but without success – not surprisingly, given their incompatible goals. Bush said he would not tolerate a nuclear Iran but some of his European counterparts approved of Iran having some level of nuclear capability.
Nor will the Security Council control Iran, for two permanent members (Russia and China) are important providers of knowledge and technology to Iran. Although the Russians, with population centers in close proximity to Iran, might wake up to the dangers of proliferation, the Chinese are another matter. Beijing has succeeded in signing deals with Iran in the past year that basically offer Tehran a Security Council veto in return for energy resources.
 

The Response

To challenge Iran, Washington should.
Deploy defenses to protect countries like Jordan, Saudi Arabia, or Kuwait from Iranian ballistic missiles. The Iraqis have, in particular, cited Iran's capabilities as a threat. This would blunt Iranian influence in the region.
Counter proliferation, for which the Bush administration's Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) has been extremely important toward that goal. (PSI is a series of bilateral arrangements between more than 60 countries that allow for mutual alteration of international law to permit intelligence sharing, hot pursuit into international waters, and other matters, in situations when weapons of mass destruction are involved.) PSI has managed to curtail as much as two-thirds of North Korea's missile trading over the last two years. Washington should think of bringing PSI to the Persian Gulf and nearby regions to contain technology flowing in and out of Iran
These steps can delay Iran's nuclear capabilities but not stop them. It is, therefore, important to focus on who will be ruling in Tehran. Iranians are dissatisfied with the government now, and the country is worse off or at least just as bad now as in 1977. Half of Iranians live under Iran's poverty line, the unemployment rate is about 20 percent and rising, and the drug-use rate is 5 times higher than that of the U.S.
The U.S. government needs to look at Iran's opposition groups and empower journalists to report on domestic situations. It says it supports Iran's move to democracy, but it does not show that. Washington needs to clarify its message to Iranians. The opposition needs to know it has solid American support, and will for the long run.
There will be a nuclear Iran in 5 or 10 years, whose hands do we want the weapons in?

You may freely forward this information, but on condition that you send the text as an integral whole along with complete information about its author, date, and source.

Russian version
An introduction to MAOF
Haim Goldman

Dear Friends,

Would you believe that the undersigned has anything in common with

-- Professor Victor Davis Hanson (Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University),
-- Dr Charles Krauthammer, (Washington Post, Time, The Weekly Standard),
-- Caroline Glick (Deputy Managing Editor of the Jerusalem Post),
-- Jonathan Tobin (Executive Editor of the Philadelphia Jewish Exponent).

Amazingly, the editors of the MAOF website decided that the missives of the undersigned are worthy of translation and posting along the articles written by these distinguished authors.

The first letter was published without the consent of the undersigned.
However, after thorough examination of the laudable attitude of MAOF and of the excellent contents of the website, the undersigned had most graciously granted his permission for publication of his missives in both English and Russian.

“Analytical Group MAOF” [1] is an organisation founded about ten years ago by Russian-speaking Jewish intellectuals. The attitude of MAOF is definitely pro-Zionist -- unambiguously and unapologetically.

One of MAOF’s primary purposes is providing information and analysis about Middle-Eastern and world affairs as well as about Israel’s history, values and dilemmas. In addition to extensive publication activity in various media, MAOF also organises excursions and seminars. While the vast majority of the contents of the MAOF website is in Russian, texts originally written in English are provided in the original [2] as well as in Russian.

There are arguably about 250 millions of Russian-speakers worldwide and many of them do not read English. The indisputable motivation for the author’s permission was to grant those millions of disadvantaged people the grand benefit of reading the author’s ruminations. If the author is ever maliciously accused that his tacit motivation for authorising the publication was his craving to be listed along with the above-mentioned distinguished writers, his plea will definitely be “nolo contendere”.

The editors of MAOF expressed their gratitude by granting the undersigned a privilege that no other author got – the opportunity to review and correct the Russian translation before publication. The original letters of the undersigned are at [3] and their Russian version is at [4]. At of today, only two letters are posted but several other letters are pending translation.

You are kindly ENCOURAGED TO RECOMMEND the MAOF website to your friends and colleagues worldwide, particularly those who speak Russian. Those who do not enjoy the benefit of proficiency in the exquisite Russian language can find many thought-provoking and inspiring articles about Middle-Eastern and world affairs in the English section [2].

Sincerely,

Haim Goldman
28.10.2006

REFERENCES:

[1] http://maof.rjews.net
[2] section.php3? sid=37&num=25
[3] authorg.php3? id=2107&type=a
[4] authorg.php3? id=2166&type=a