Maof

Vol. 4, No. 1   April 22, 2003 • 21 Nisan 5763

The following analysis was written by Barry Rubin, director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center http://gloria.idc.ac.il and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal http://meria.idc.ac.il.

In the aftermath of the Iraq war, what will happen to the Israel-Palestinian issue?  This article tries to provide a roadmap for the roadmap.

The "roadmap" is the nickname for the current international plan for advancing negotiations.  Expectations depend on which of two possible interpretations are used to understand its provisions.

The European interpretation, which no doubt is shared by the Palestinians, can be basically summarized as saying that the roadmap sets a schedule for creating a Palestinian state in the next three years no matter what happens.

The U.S. interpretation, which is closer to -- but not identical with -- the Israeli view is that the Palestinians are offered a state within a reasonable time frame but can only achieve it by making a satisfactory deal with Israel.  This requires them, first, to prove their readiness and ability to end the current violence, followed by a peace treaty resolving all the issues.

There is no doubt that the U.S. standpoint is going to triumph in the actual application of this plan.  Therefore, the roadmap is not a threat to legitimate Israeli interests.

What has happened, then, is both a dramatic change and no change at all.  The clear and internationally accepted aim of negotiations is to create an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and
East Jerusalem.  Yet the details are subject to Israeli approval while the fundamental goal is in practice the same as that which underlay the Oslo agreements a decade ago.

The other factor is timing.  The Palestinians can get such a state in three years or thirty years depending on how they behave in practice and how flexible they are in negotiations.  Any Israeli leader who is not a fool is going to demand, and properly so, that negotiations must be preceded by a serious Palestinian effort to make and enforce a ceasefire.  No doubletalk or playing games is going to be accepted.  It is reasonable to believe that the United States will back up that demand, not just as a favor to Israel but because of its own experience and knowledge that continued warfare would doom negotiations.

There are U.S.-Israel differences but any serious clash can be avoided by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon with a minimum of flexibility on his part.  First, there are some Israeli objections to the plan itself.  Many of these, especially those regarding security arrangements, can be handled in the course of negotiations, if they take place.  But the United States refuses to change the plan itself and it is better for Israel to go along with this demand.  It does not want to be the one perceived as sabotaging the effort, a role that Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat will be happy to play given his long-term record in such matters.  The other, and principal, problem is that of settlements.  The plan demands that Israel cease construction on Jewish settlements in the territories including any building for population growth.  This requires Israel to make a concession beyond what was written in the Oslo agreements.  Yet this is not such a great sacrifice and Sharon should overcome right-wing opposition on this point.

Implementation of such a pledge would be tied to a real ceasefire which meets Israel's definition of an end to the violence.  Such a construction stoppage would not be a high price to pay for that gain and, of course, its continuation would be based on the Palestinians keeping their side of the bargain.  It would also avoid friction with a United States which is at the peak of its power in the region.

Beyond the settlement issue, though, pretty much everything else rests with the Palestinian side.  The appointment of Abu Mazin as prime minister is a step forward.  But whether it is a big, small, or quickly reversed step is yet to be determined.  At this moment, it is still possible that Abu Mazin will resign or give up because Arafat is sabotaging him in the appointment of a cabinet.

In addition, of course, Arafat retains control of the security forces and runs negotiations with Israel.  Without any power in these two sectors, Abu Mazin cannot deliver anything that would move the roadmap forward.

Within mainstream Palestinian politics today there are now three loose factions which sharply differing strategies and goals:

Loyalists:  Many Fatah and Palestinian Authority officials still support Arafat in whatever he wants, or at least will do nothing against his will.
Militants:  A group with a big base of support in Fatah believes that a violent revolution against Israel is the way to obtain an independent state and everything else they want.  Many of these people are ready to work with Hamas toward this end.
Moderates:  The smallest group has concluded that the intifada is a failure and must be ended, wish to reduce Arafat's power, and are willing to try to negotiate a compromise peace with Israel.  And even Abu Mazin has his heart set on a "right of return" which would probably make a peace deal impossible.
The Palestinian masses are torn between all three groups, taking some of their beliefs from each camp though these ideas, expectations, and strategies are ultimately quite contradictory.

Is their objective to destroy Israel or make peace with Israel, continue the fighting or end the fighting, back Arafat or replace Arafat?  No clear decision seems even close to being made.  The choice may still be years away, may in fact be impossible until after Arafat dies and a new leadership -- or perhaps leaderships -- arises.

A dramatic post-Iraq advance in what used to be a peace process, then, is far less likely than many people are suggesting.  An end to the 30-month-long Palestinian war on Israel, though, would still be quite welcome.

The existence of a map for resolving the Israel-Palestinian conflict is not exactly new.  The problem is that the travelers are on foot and it is still going to be a very long trip indeed.

Russian version